The Iowa Supreme Court issued its opinion Friday, May 1st in Richmond v. Jefferson County Attorney, unanimously affirming the district court’s ruling that Jefferson County Sheriff Bart Richmond should be removed from the Brady-Giglio list maintained by Jefferson County Attorney Chauncey Moulding. The decision, written by Justice McDermott and joined by all justices, rejects Moulding’s constitutional challenges to the statute that allows officers to seek judicial review of their placement on such lists.
Background
The case stems from an April 2024 incident in which a Jefferson County sheriff’s deputy forcibly shoved a handcuffed passenger’s head toward a vehicle’s trunk during a DWI arrest assist, yelling at the passenger while holding his face inches from the vehicle. Body camera footage captured the incident. Moulding reviewed the footage and emailed Sheriff Richmond twice asking whether the conduct violated the sheriff’s office’s use-of-force policy. Richmond never responded to either email, though he and his chief deputy met with the deputy and ordered retraining.
Dissatisfied with Richmond’s lack of response, Moulding sent the footage to the Keokuk County Attorney for independent review. When Moulding’s office later requested a copy of the sheriff’s use-of-force policy, Richmond initially refused, insisting the Keokuk County Attorney contact him directly. Moulding ultimately had to personally order Richmond to produce the policy under threat of a judicial injunction. Richmond eventually complied but declined to share details of internal disciplinary actions, citing privacy concerns.
Moulding then initiated proceedings to place Richmond on the Brady-Giglio list — a record maintained by prosecutors identifying officers whose history of misconduct, dishonesty, or credibility issues could compromise their testimony. As required by law, Moulding notified Richmond of a scheduled list placement interview, but when Richmond’s request to reschedule to accommodate legal counsel was denied, he declined to participate. Moulding officially added Richmond to the list, asserting that Richmond’s conduct during the investigation cast doubt on his judgment, credibility, candor, and truthfulness. He then sent a separate letter to law enforcement agencies statewide — including the Fairfield Police Department, Iowa State Patrol, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, Iowa Attorney General’s Office, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Iowa — advising that Richmond was no longer considered a credible witness and should not be placed in positions where he may be called to testify.
Richmond requested reconsideration, appeared virtually rather than in person as Moulding had requested, and refused to turn on his camera during the meeting despite repeated requests and without explanation. Moulding upheld his original decision. Richmond then filed a petition for judicial review under Iowa Code § 80F.1(25). The district court reviewed the evidence privately in chambers and ruled in Richmond’s favor, finding that while Richmond’s actions lacked forthrightness, they did not rise to the level of actual deceit or dishonesty. The district court ordered Moulding to remove Richmond from the list. Moulding appealed, and the Iowa Supreme Court retained the case in September 2025. Oral arguments were held February 11th, 2026.
What is a Brady-Giglio List?
The Brady-Giglio list takes its name from two landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In Brady v. Maryland, the Court held that prosecutors violate due process if they suppress evidence favorable to the accused that is material to either guilt or punishment. In Giglio v. United States, the Court expanded that rule to include impeachment evidence, holding that when a witness’s reliability is central to determining guilt or innocence, failing to disclose evidence undermining that witness’s credibility justifies a new trial. Under those cases, failure to disclose an officer’s prior misconduct — such as untruthfulness or criminal activity — can warrant the reversal of a conviction. As the opinion notes, because prosecutors want to avoid building a case around an untruthful officer, being included on a Brady-Giglio list presents serious risks to an officer’s career. The opinion states that without the ability to investigate, arrest, or testify, “there is often little traditional police work left for the officer to do.”
Before 2022, Iowa prosecutors generally had free rein to manage their Brady-Giglio lists as they saw fit, with officers lacking a formal path to challenge their placement. The legislature has since passed two major rounds of reform. In 2022, lawmakers defined a Brady-Giglio list as a list compiled by a prosecuting agency containing the names and details of officers who have sustained incidents of untruthfulness, criminal convictions, candor issues, or other issues placing their credibility in question, and required prosecuting agencies to provide notice to officers and allow them to request reconsideration. In 2024, a further amendment added a layer of judicial oversight, granting officers the right to petition a district court for review of the prosecutor’s listing decision. Under that provision, upon either party’s request or the court’s own motion, the district court must perform an in camera review of the evidence — meaning privately in chambers — and may hold a closed hearing, with evidence generally kept confidential. The court is authorized to affirm, modify, or reverse a prosecuting agency’s Brady-Giglio determination and order relief, including removal of the officer from the list, “as justice may require.”
The Constitutional Questions
On appeal, Moulding raised three constitutional challenges to the statute itself rather than contesting the specific findings about Richmond. He argued that Iowa Code § 80F.1(25) violates the due process rights of criminal defendants, violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by limiting prosecutorial discretion, and is unconstitutionally vague.
Due Process
The court unanimously rejected Moulding’s due process argument. Moulding had argued that judicial review of Brady-Giglio list decisions restricts a prosecutor’s ability to disclose impeachment evidence to defendants. The court found this premise incorrect, writing that the statute “only regulates the list, not the disclosure of information in a particular case.” Removing an officer from a Brady-Giglio list does not prevent a prosecutor from later disclosing exculpatory evidence about that officer in a specific case, because the constitutional obligation to disclose such material exists independently of whether a prosecutor maintains a Brady-Giglio list at all. The court noted that nothing in the statute even requires a prosecutor’s office to create a Brady-Giglio list in the first place.
The court cited a Pennsylvania court decision supporting that conclusion, noting that a prosecutor may provide information about any officer to criminal defense counsel regardless of whether that officer is on the list.
The court also pushed back on what it described as Moulding’s overly broad interpretation of what constitutes a Brady-Giglio list. The opinion states that a Brady-Giglio list “is not a catchall term for every internal note, discussion, or evaluation a prosecutor’s office makes regarding an officer’s credibility” but rather a formal, prospective, and publicly available declaration of an officer’s unreliability — characteristics apparent in both Moulding’s detailed letter to Richmond explaining the placement and his separate letter to law enforcement officials around the state.
The court further noted that when a court orders removal from the list, it may be because the underlying evidence was found neither material nor favorable under the Brady standard, and that such a judicial determination could actually provide an additional safeguard for prosecutors in ensuring they have met their constitutional disclosure duties. The court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the statute does not intrude on a prosecutor’s due process obligations to defendants.
Separation of Powers
The court also rejected Moulding’s separation-of-powers argument. While acknowledging that the prosecutorial function is historically within the province of the executive branch, the court found that the statute does not interfere with core prosecutorial functions. The opinion states that although a district court may order a prosecutor to remove an officer from a list, “the statute gives the court no authority to require the prosecutor to call the officer as a witness at trial or to disclose (or not disclose) exculpatory or impeachment information in particular cases; those powers remain with the prosecutor.” The statute only authorizes judicial intervention as to the separate ability to maintain a Brady-Giglio list, and only in prescribed situations.
Moulding had relied in part on Savage v. Maryland, a federal case addressing prosecutorial immunity, to support his argument. The court distinguished that case on multiple grounds, noting it addressed immunity from civil suit rather than the legislature’s authority to regulate, did not address separation-of-powers concerns, and focused on First Amendment implications of an employment decision — categorically different from judicial review of a Brady-Giglio list decision.
The court concluded that the statute represents the three branches of government functioning as intended. “Ultimately, of course, both prosecutors and law enforcement officers are performing executive functions,” the opinion states. “The legislature’s enactment of § 80F.1(25), in effect, regulates certain aspects of their relations and allows judicial review of disputes under that law. This is the three branches at work, not a violation of separation of powers.”
Void for Vagueness
The court declined to address Moulding’s vagueness argument entirely, finding it had not been properly preserved at the district court level. The opinion notes that while Moulding’s briefs offered criticism about the drafting of the Brady-Giglio provisions, they did not include a formal constitutional vagueness challenge, and the district court never ruled on the issue. Quoting prior Iowa precedent, the court wrote that “issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Because Moulding failed to preserve the issue, the court declined to consider it.
The Ruling
The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in full, rejecting all three of Moulding’s constitutional challenges and upholding the removal of Richmond from the Brady-Giglio list. The opinion was unanimous, with all justices joining.
What It Means
The ruling settles a significant legal question in Iowa, confirming that Iowa Code § 80F.1(25) — which gives law enforcement officers the right to seek judicial review of their placement on a Brady-Giglio list — is constitutional. Prosecutors across the state cannot unilaterally place officers on such lists without those officers having a legal avenue to challenge the listing in court. At the same time, the court made clear that removing an officer from a list does not eliminate a prosecutor’s independent constitutional obligation to disclose relevant exculpatory or impeachment evidence in specific cases.
The case drew significant attention from the legal community and the Iowa legislature, which has amended the Brady-Giglio statute every year since 2021. Twenty-eight Iowa state senators filed an amicus brief in the case. Oral arguments were held during a rare evening session of the court in February, reflecting the significance of the legal questions at stake. The full opinion and oral arguments are available through the Iowa Courts system.
Sheriff Bart Richmond Statement
Following the ruling, Sheriff Bart Richmond issued the following statement to Ottumwa Radio: “The Iowa Supreme Court ruling: Bart Richmond v. Jefferson County Attorney speaks for itself. A good honest person will ALWAYS prevail over corruption and evil.”
County Attorney Chauncey Moulding Statement
Following the ruling, County Attorney Chauncey Moulding issued the following statement to Ottumwa Radio: “The County argued that Iowa Code 80F.1(25) was unconstitutional and impeded our ability to do our jobs. In light of this ruling from the State Supreme Court, we are tasked with interpreting the opinion and law in order to ensure that this office’s ethical and legal obligations are upheld.”
