The Iowa Supreme Court held oral arguments Wednesday evening, February 11, 2026, in a case that could reshape how prosecutors handle officer credibility issues and affect law enforcement careers statewide.
The case, Richmond v. Jefferson County Attorney (Case No. 25-0366), challenges whether Iowa’s Brady-Giglio list statute unconstitutionally interferes with prosecutorial duties while questioning whether it adequately protects officers’ reputational rights.
Assistant County Attorney Elizabeth Estey represented Jefferson County Attorney Chauncey Moulding, while attorney Charles Gribble argued on behalf of Sheriff Bart Richmond. Estey opened with 15 minutes of argument, Gribble followed with 15 minutes, and Estey returned for a five-minute rebuttal.
Background
Jefferson County Sheriff Bart Richmond was placed on a Brady-Giglio list by the County Attorney following an April 2024 excessive use of force incident. After reviewing body camera footage, the County Attorney emailed Richmond twice asking about the incident. Richmond didn’t respond to either email. The County Attorney had said he would assume no problem without a response, and Richmond testified he agreed with that approach.
The County Attorney then sent letters to law enforcement agencies statewide—including the State Patrol, DCI, and the Southern District—stating Richmond could no longer serve as a credible witness in any case. The district court granted Richmond’s request for removal from the list, and the County Attorney appealed. The Supreme Court retained the case on September 30, 2025.
Constitutional Questions
Separation of Powers: Does judicial review of Brady-Giglio lists unconstitutionally intrude on executive branch powers?
Due Process: Does the statute violate criminal defendants’ rights to exculpatory evidence?
Arguments
County Attorney’s Position
Estey argued prosecutors face an impossible situation: they cannot fulfill their constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence without creating a Brady-Giglio list, but creating that list then subjects their decisions to judicial review.
The statute broadly defines a “list” as “names and details of officers who have sustained incidents of untruthfulness, criminal convictions, or candor issues.” Estey said this means “a prosecutor can’t collect, can’t share information without essentially creating a list.”
She described practical problems: Jefferson County has three attorneys who can share information verbally, but “if you’re coming from Polk County or a larger county where you have multiple prosecutors, how are you supposed to share that information?” The statute doesn’t even specify if a list must be written or verbal.
Estey argued there’s no harm to officers because Iowa Code prohibits them from being “discharged or disciplined” solely for being on the list. When justices suggested being labeled untrustworthy could be “fatal to their career,” Estey called the impact “speculative at best.” She said officers can seek reconsideration from prosecutors, and “that’s where that determination should remain, not with the judiciary.”
On the “candor issue,” Estey defended the classification by emphasizing the broader context of an excessive force investigation where the office still hadn’t received requested operating procedures.
Sheriff Richmond’s Position
Gribble emphasized the devastating career impact, noting the County Attorney sent letters statewide declaring Richmond “can no longer be a witness” and is “not a credible person. You are not a trustworthy person.”
“If you can’t be a witness and you can’t engage in any law enforcement activity that would result in you being a witness, how can you investigate crime? How can you arrest individuals?” Gribble asked.
His central argument: “The duties of the county attorney are the same, whether someone’s on the list or not.” Prosecutors must still disclose all exculpatory evidence—body cameras, videos, reports—regardless of list placement. The statute’s procedural protections don’t interfere with executive functions but simply ensure fairness for officers.
Gribble said the reconsideration process is inadequate: “Going back to the same person that put you on the list in the first place does not really help with the officer’s reputational rights.”
He challenged whether the facts met statutory requirements. The statute requires “sustained incidents of untruthfulness or lack of candor, meaning multiple,” with findings through progressive discipline. Judge Farrell found that while Richmond “could have cooperated more,” nothing “raised to the level of untruthfulness or lack of candor.”
Gribble distinguished internal tracking from formal Brady-Giglio lists. Keeping “a secret list, which is really a Brady-Giglio list” would violate the statute by denying officers notice and due process.
Key Judicial Questions
Chief Justice Christensen drew on her prosecutorial experience: “I think people are crazy if they don’t think we have in our heads, we know. We know who we can trust. We know who has pushed the buttons with us. We never created a list at that time.” She asked whether mental judgments must be formalized on paper.
Justices challenged both sides: Whether being listed would be “fatal to their career in law enforcement,” whether asking the County Attorney to reconsider his own decision provides meaningful due process, and whether “the entire Brady regime is predicated on judges making determinations about materiality and credibility of witnesses.”
One justice noted Iowa’s unique dynamic: “Both the county attorney and the sheriff are elected by the citizens of Iowa, and they have to kind of work with each other, even though one isn’t answerable to the other.”
County Attorney’s Perspective
In an interview following the oral arguments, Jefferson County Attorney Chauncey Moulding provided additional context on the case and its implications. Sheriff Richmond had not responded to interview requests at the time of publication.
General comments:
“I appreciate the public interest in this matter of first impression, which addresses important matters of police accountability, prosecutorial discretion, and an attorney’s ethical duties as a minister of justice,” Moulding said. “I think Assistant County Attorney Estey handled her argument with wisdom and finesse and showed her expert understanding of the legal issues at hand.”
On whether the justices understood prosecutors’ practical challenges:
“I believe the court is well appraised as to the mess the legislature has made with crafting this legislation, and the untenable position it places prosecutors in throughout the State,” Moulding said. “I particularly appreciate Chief Justice Christensen’s comments from her perspective as a former prosecutor.”
On the “candor issue” classification:
Moulding pushed back on characterizations of the case as merely about email exchanges. “The appellee’s attorney, Mr. Gribble, classified this issue as one of email exchanges. That is an incorrect reading of the facts,” he said. “The candor issue arose following active interference in an investigation into an unlawful use of force occurred. That involved email exchanges, but also included requests for documents, and directives to sheriff’s office employees which impeded a lawful inquiry. These facts support such a classification.”
On future procedures if the statute is upheld:
“The Jefferson County Attorney’s office follows the law as applied and interpreted by the Courts, while continuing to uphold the ethical obligations required under the law,” Moulding said.
On the impact on criminal defendants’ rights:
“The ethical obligations under the U.S. Supreme Court’s legal opinions in Brady, Giglio, and those cases progeny exist independent of any statutory obligations under the law. That is the real conflict here,” Moulding explained. “The obligations to disclose credibility issues regarding a particular officer does not go away if the legislature redefines what a ‘list’ is. There seems to be some confusion as to what a list entails, and Mr. Gribble arguing that a list can be kept of non-credible officers if it isn’t titled a ‘Brady Giglio list’ seems to miss the point.”
On broader precedential impact:
“I think this is the most interesting and pressing issue in the legal field in Iowa right now, as evidenced by the attention this issue has gotten, the fact that the Court set this matter for an evening session as the only matter on the docket yesterday, and the attention to this issue from the legislature,” Moulding said. “I think the legislature knows this statute is flawed, as shown by the fact that they have amended it every single year since 2021. That is not suggestive of a solid foundation for a law.”
On the working relationship with the Sheriff’s Department:
Moulding distinguished between working relationships with department personnel and issues with Sheriff Richmond himself. “There has been no impact on the working relationship between deputies, jailers, and the County Attorney’s Office. Our cooperation in investigating, preventing, and prosecuting violations of the law remains stable and strong. The professionals on both sides continue to do their jobs and serve Jefferson County effectively.”
However, he expressed concerns about the Sheriff’s leadership. “One of the factors that gave rise to this case, including the candor issues previously referenced, was the Sheriff’s refusal to provide his most up-to-date standard operating procedures (SOPs) when requested. To date, my office has still not received a complete set of the Sheriff’s Office SOPs. That is an unreasonable and frankly unacceptable position for the County’s legal office to be in. By contrast, the Fairfield Police Department publishes its SOPs online for public review. The Sheriff’s refusal to share similar materials with the County Attorney’s Office, even upon request, reflects a concerning lack of transparency and a failure of leadership.”
Moulding said Richmond has declined repeated invitations to meet. “The Sheriff has declined repeated invitations to meet face-to-face to discuss how we can better cooperate on matters critical to Jefferson County. Even after being directed by a County Supervisor to do so, he has not engaged in good-faith efforts to work through these issues. That posture is both disappointing and short-sighted.”
Despite the tensions, Moulding said his door remains open. “Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules, my focus remains on ensuring effective law enforcement and prosecution in this county. My invitation to sit down across the table and address these issues constructively remains open. If the Sheriff prefers to bring legal counsel to such a meeting, that is certainly his choice, although I do not believe it should be necessary for two elected officials working toward the same public mission.”
On Justice Christensen’s “mental lists” observation:
“All prosecutors know their officers and witnesses and who they are dealing with. It is human nature,” Moulding said. “I don’t think it is a workable solution to expect an attorney’s office to meet its ethical obligations by winging it with a ‘mental Giglio list’ or a ‘Brady list of the heart.'”
On participating in a night court session:
“Night sessions are rare enough that the choice itself is part of the message, and I read this decision as the Court taking this important matter very seriously,” Moulding said. “This isn’t a garden-variety appeal; it’s a statewide structural question about how Brady/Giglio disclosure obligations interface with a new statute. The evening session lets the Court ‘show its work’ on a controversial separation-of-powers question and it gives the legal community a structured opportunity to observe and discuss the issue with fewer barriers. It is always an honor and a privilege to appear in the highest court in the State.”
What Happens Next
A decision is expected in April, as it usually takes two months, though it could be a shorter or longer time than that, as justice has its own time. Chief Justice Christensen did make note that a decision is definitely expected before June 30th, when judicial terms expire. The oral arguments can be viewed on the Iowa Courts YouTube channel.
Photography courtesy of Wikipedia.
